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Abstract
This paper examined the impact of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies on the internal security of African states with specific reference to Nigeria's amnesty policy in Niger Delta region. The study adopted the rational choice theory of terrorism as its theoretical framework and derived its data from secondary sources which included official policy documents from the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria's amnesty office including textbooks, journal articles and the internet etc. Data collected from these sources were analyzed through qualitative method and content analysis. Findings from the study shows that nonviolent counterterrorism strategies through post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes have helped in resettling several ex-combatants and their families back to the society in several African states including Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) etc. In the same vein, the study observed that use of military force (violent counterterrorism strategy) by states have also helped to escalate and prolong conflicts in Africa. However, some recommendations were made which included the need to strengthen civil-military relations especially in the area of intelligence gathering and dissemination. There is need for African states to also engage in counter-radicalization of their citizens through massive investments in education, public enlightenment and socio-economic development in of provision of basic social amenities.

Keywords: Nonviolent counterterrorism, African states, Niger Delta region, Amnesty policy and socio-economic development.

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Background to the Study
Conflict is viewed by scholars as a global phenomenon that is inevitable hence, Africa is equally faced with internal security challenges caused by a number of factors which include: mass poverty, ethnicity, mounting external debts, electoral disputes and periodic outbreak of violence and in some cases military coups and insurgency hence, persistent conflict in Africa has also affected the political economy and internal security of the continent adversely. Available records also revealed that most of the conflicts in Africa assume dangerous dimensions with aggrieved groups and organizations adopting guerrilla and unconventional methods based on terrorist orientations and ideology. Thus, with the attack of the United States on September 11, 2001, terrorism has been projected as the new international security challenge of the 21st century. Understanding the conditions conducive for terrorism and insurgency could produce a more logical and consistent approach to combating terrorism hence, the 1999 Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism clearly state the deep concern over the scope and seriousness of the phenomenon of terrorism and the danger it poses to the stability and security of states thus, article 4(2) of the 1999 Algiers convention urged members of the African Union (AU) to adopt national legislations aimed at preventing and combating terrorist acts at all levels. It will be recalled that decades of environmental abuse and human degradation coupled with unfulfilled promises on the part of the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies led to violent agitations and armed struggle by the Niger Delta people against the Nigerian state. Actions such as kidnapping, hostage taking, vandalism of oil facilities etc. were intensified prompting the proclamation of amnesty to Niger Delta agitators by the Nigerian government in June, 2009. Within the context of this study, Nigeria’s amnesty policy in Niger Delta region will be critically analyzed and appraised as a nonviolent counterterrorism strategy in order to determine its impact on the internal security of Nigeria and indeed Africa.

It is on record that prior to the proclamation of the amnesty policy in the Niger Delta region, pre-amnesty Niger Delta witnessed series of conflicts and violence between Niger Delta youths, multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state. The situation led to destruction of oil facilities and the kidnapping of expatriates and hostage taking of both Nigerians and foreigners. Ibaba and Arugu (2013) captured the mood of the pre-amnesty Niger Delta when they observed that militia groups protesting against the Nigerian state and the activities of oil companies operating in the area for deprivation, neglect and environmental degradation, confronted security forces, attacked oil company workers and randomly kidnap oil workers. The situation degenerated further with the militarization of the entire Niger Delta region by the Nigeria armed forces hence, prompting most investors and multinational oil companies to withdraw from the troubled region for security reasons. The situation in Niger Delta and other parts of Africa clearly revealed that terrorism and insurgency remains a major threat to peace and security at national, regional and global levels hence, studies into counterterrorism strategies especially nonviolent counterterrorism strategies will no doubt help to correct existing defects and gaps leading to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and other victims of conflict and war across the world.
Literature Review
This section of the paper examined materials relevant to the subject-matter under investigation. Literature review no doubt helps to give direction to any research as it helps to increase and understanding of the subject-matter under investigation. However, apart from views expressed by writers on the effectiveness or other wise of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies as a means of ensuring global peace and security, there has been a dearth of literature that brings to the lime light the driving motive for the proclamation of amnesty and other nonviolent strategies in Africa. Given this situation, a comprehensive review of literature for this study therefore becomes imperative. Thus, for the avoidance of doubt and to further sharpen the focus of this study, the literature review is divided into three categories: History and consequences of Nigeria's Niger Delta crisis, the concept of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies, models for analyzing terrorism and terrorist activities.

History and Consequences of Nigeria's Niger Delta Crisis
Several factors account for the crisis in the Niger Delta region but the Niger Delta people through several petitions point to the devastation of their land, the pollution of the waters and the destruction of their flora and fauna through oil exploitation and exploration activities by the Nigeria state and oil multinational companies as major factors responsible for the conflict in Niger Delta. Thus, the inability of oil companies to fulfil community demands and memorandum of understanding coupled with the protection they enjoy from the Nigeria state is no doubt responsible for the escalation of violence in the Niger Delta region. It will be recalled that from 1956, economic activities in the Niger Delta now revolved around oil hence, the high rate of sea-piracy, kidnappings and illegal refineries in the Niger Delta region which has constantly turned the oil rich region into a battlefield.

In a paper titled “On the militarization of Nigeria's Niger Delta: The genesis of ethnic militia in Rivers state” published in the Centre for Ethnic and Conflict Studies (CENTECS) vol. 1, No. 2, Sofiri Joab Peterside (2005) traced the history of militancy and violence in the Niger Delta to alienation and marginalization of the people by the Nigeria state and multinational oil companies. While reiterating his position, Sofiri Joab Peterside argued that the brutal suppression of the Delta has a long history and that the deportation of king Jaja of Obobo (1887), Nana of Itsekiri (1892), Overamwen (1897), King Ibanichuka of Okrika (1896), and the deportation of King Koko of Brass are cardinal evidences of conspiracy against the Niger Delta and its people. While commenting on the consequences of the Niger Delta crisis with specific reference to the violent confrontations between the Choba community and Wilbros Corporation, Mac Ogonor C.U. (1992), in a paper titled “International law, multinational corporations and the Niger Delta crisis: The case of Choba community and Wilbros Corporation”, lamented that such confrontations often lead to deaths and loss of valuable properties and investments on both sides. He stated that at the end of Choba-Wilbros conflict of 1999, property worth over two hundred million Naira belonging to Wilbros Nigeria Limited were either looted or destroyed and that the once booming university community of Choba was completely deserted due to the conflict. According to him, lack of commitment and willingness on the part of Wilbros Nigeria Limited to honour and respect existing agreements and memorandum of understanding (MOU) were factors that help to escalate the crisis. On
why Wilbros and other multinational oil companies always get the backing of the Nigerian state during conflict involving them and host communities Mac Ogonor (1992), explained that Wilbros and other multinational oil firms are complex organizations with international legal status hence, it is quite difficult to prosecute multinational corporations operating in Nigeria. In a publication titled “Debating petroleum and environmental justice in the Niger Delta, Nigeria: Stakeholders’ perspectives” published in the Centre for Ethnic and Conflict Studies (CENTECS) journal, Ikporukpo (2011), corroborated the views of Ogonor (1992), but added that the exploration for and exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta region which is the main centre of oil production in Nigeria, necessitate the provision of seismic routes, explorable roads, carnals, and associated facilities which affect the biota and fauna. Hence, he argued that oil spills and the flaring of gas have environmental implications on the Niger Delta region. Also commenting on the consequences of insecurity and violence in the Niger Delta region Ikporukpo, C.O. (2011), reiterated that the insecurity which has resulted from the politicization of oil had implications for oil company operations and the development of the Niger Delta region and Nigeria in general. In his words:

“Oil companies lost several production days and also suffered reduction in production in Ogoniland for a long time as a result of the Ogoni crisis which led to violence and insecurity. The militarization of the Niger Delta region by the Nigerian state therefore implies that no meaningful development can take place in the region since flights of capital and of people became the order of the day”.

Also affirming the fact that the Niger Delta crisis affected Nigeria's economy and oil production capacity adversely, Ejibunu, T. (2008), in his article titled “Economic cost of the Niger Delta crisis”, published in The Punch Newspaper of Tuesday 30 December lamented that the crisis in the Niger Delta has made Nigeria's oil production capacity to drop as the leading oil producing country in Africa and the sixth producer of the commodity in the world. He added that the violence in the region caused Nigeria's oil output to decline to between 650,000 to 872,000 barrels per day hence; he explained that Nigeria lost about $5,930,799,000 dollars to oil theft and illegal refineries. He therefore cautioned that the Nigerian government should take a second look at the problems of the Niger Delta by finding workable and practicable solutions to all the issues.

The Concept of Nonviolent Counterterrorism Strategies
This aspect of the study examined the concept of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies which is no doubt a source of debate and argument among scholars in international relations and peace and conflict scholars. Nonviolent counterterrorism strategy is a conflict resolution mechanism that is devoid of military force or acts of violence. It relies on concepts such as dialogue, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, conciliation etc. Thus, within the context of this study, Nigeria’s amnesty policy and its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme will be analysed and appraised as a nonviolent counterterrorism strategy. In a publication titled “We need nonviolent counterterrorism strategies” Niemela (2012), added his voice to the debate on counterterrorism strategies when he stated categorically that all violent counterterrorism intervention polices have completely failed. In his words: “We are sowing
and reaping perpetual tragedy with this violence machine and the only people benefiting are sitting on top of a mountain of cash in the conflict industry hence, it is time for a major shift in conflict management strategies”.

He further urged states to adopt nonviolent counterterrorism strategies by investing massively in social and economic development initiatives in any region in which terrorist groups are engaged. Tom Hastings (2004), a professor of conflict resolution at the Portland State University in his book “nonviolent response to terrorism” cautioned that nonviolent counterterrorism strategies will be counterproductive in any state or society where basic amenities and infrastructure are lacking. In the same vein, Harvard lecturer, Louise Richardson (2007), and Kim Cragin (2003), in their study on social and economic development to inhibit terrorism made the same argument by corroborating the views of Tom Hastings. However, the issue of violent and nonviolent counterterrorism school of thought is still a source of debate among scholars. In an attempt to understand and get a better picture of the concept “terrorism”, some scholars have come up with some categorization of terrorism such as criminal terrorism and psychological terrorism. Criminal terrorism relates to the use of acts of terror for private material gains such as kidnapping people for ransom, while psychological terrorism has to do with terror perpetrated by mentally unbalanced persons; what we can call violence perpetrated without a rational or definite purpose or motive.

This therefore, implies that the concept of terrorism can be viewed and analyzed from different perspectives. Thus, Thornton for instance, made as distinction between what he called “enforcement terror” and “agitational terror”. Enforcement terror according to him is used by those in power to suppress opposition to their authority while agitational terror is used by those who want to disrupt the existing order and supplant it with their own. On the other hand, May corroborated the views of Thornton with what he called “regime of terror” and “siege of terror” which according to him refer to “terrorism in the service of established order” and “terrorism in the service of revolutionary movements. The two perspectives by Thornton and May have no doubt helped to re-enforce the argument that terrorism is as much a tool for the revisionist as it is for those who defend the status quo (Imobighe, 2006:p.15)

Models for Analyzing Terrorism and Terrorist Activities
The above analysis clearly indicates that terrorism lacks a universally accepted definition and this has serious implications for how it should be tackled (Masters and Hen, 2012:p.343). Thus, the way the phenomenon of terrorism is defined depends largely on the perspective of the individual or group that applies the term. The concept of terrorism is therefore, a highly contested concept that is often difficult to delineate from other forms of political violence (Schuurman and Ejikman, 2013). In spite of the complex nature of the concept, scholars agree that defining terrorism is of high importance as it helps to determine which action counts as acts of terrorism: who a terrorist is : and the appropriate courses of action that can be taken to deal with the threat (Hodgson and Tadros, 2013:494). The absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism no doubt makes it difficult to have any direct theory of how to deal with the phenomenon hence, this study defines terrorism as “premeditated politically motivated use, threatened use of violence in order to induce a state of terror in its immediate victims, often
to influence another less reachable audience such as a government” (Barash and Webel, 2014:73). In the light of the above, Crenshaw (2007:7), rightly argued that governments across the world must think outside the box given the range of motivations, strategies and tactics that terrorist groups adopt.

Available literature suggests that there are identifiable and unique characteristics that distinguish it from other forms political violence (Jackson, 2008). Thus, this study will examine the war (military) model and the criminal justice models/theories of terrorism. The traditional frameworks for analyzing counterterrorism campaigns structure debates around a war (or military) model or a criminal justice model (Wilkinson, 2006: Schmid, 2004:197). Terrorism from the perspective of the war model according to Pedhazur and Ramstop (2001), is regarded as an act of revolutionary warfare hence, they argued that this model tends to frame the struggle against terrorism in terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing the strategy. An example of the war model according to Pedhazur and Ramstop (2001) is the United States (US) war against terror campaign against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East. It will be recalled that in a 2008 study of 648 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006, Jones and Libicki (2008), discovered that military force had rarely been effective in defeating terrorism while reliance on conventional military forces have also been counterproductive.

On the other hand, Smith (2007:6), argued that while it is true that a military solution will not solve a political problem, a properly deployed army can in the short term deny a terrorist group or individual the environment to operate. According to him a classical case to demonstrate the effectiveness of the military model or approach in the war against terrorism is the case of Afghanistan where the United States military operation was successful in denying al-Qaeda freedom of movement by removing the pro-al-Qaeda regime from power. The argument here is that while long-term military campaigns have been faced with challenges, a short-term well defined military mission could be effective in mitigating the threat of terrorism (Blyth, 2013). While condemning the war (military) model, Niemela (2012) and other nonviolent scholars argued that military force alone cannot eradicate the threat of terrorism. Thus, Jenkins (2008), added that all military responses to terrorism are inherently illegitimate and conceptually flawed. On the other hand, the criminal justice model for analyzing terrorism and terrorist acts closely related to the war model, perceives terrorists as criminals that must be stopped and accords the police with the primary responsibility and mandate of responding to terrorism and terrorist acts or threats. On their part, Crelinsten and Schmid, (1992: 332), contended that the criminal justice model involves the use of minimal force that requires an exercise of judgment on the part of the officers.

However, determining an act of terrorism strictly as a criminal act embrace what Essig (2001:15), calls the law enforcement paradigm performing a response which further entails an investigative process, necessity of evidence constitutional provision and protection, a presumption of innocence, arrest and punishment (Perry and Carter, 1999:152). Available records however indicate that this model is defective as some legal systems are inherently inadequate and ill-equipped. For instance, Crelinsten and Schmid (1992:334), cited the
problems of applying anti-terror legislations that empowers the police to adjust judicial procedures to facilitate the prosecution of terrorist and sometimes entails the establishment of special courts and tribunals, like the specialize criminal court in Saudi Arabia that was set up in 2008 to try terrorism cases. In their word:

Another major problem associated with this model is achieving a balance between effective counterterrorism and the respect for the rule of law, this is a challenge because, in many cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, military operations often deviate from the rule of law and democratic standards. Thus, the absence of a universally acceptable legal definition of terrorism is another dilemma that makes this model contradictory. Even when it helps to identify and convict those responsible for acts of terrorism, the challenge of finding witnesses or credible evidence in such a scenario remains problematic hence, even where successful, the convicted do not often represent all those responsible, especially where they are not the main leaders of the group.

In the case of Africa and other systems where there is a lack of strong legal institutions (structures) and a total disrespect for the rule of law, the criminal justice model is not very effective. Nevertheless, scholars like Ford (2013:14), tried to explain and justify the utility of this model in the African context and consequently argued that African states cannot be expected to address all issues of socio-economic exclusion, marginalization, youth unemployment, job creation or the conditions in which the risk of terrorism might become more likely to emerge hence, he contended that states should be able to effectively determine whether its law enforcement and criminal justice system adhere to principles and policies that reduce the prospect of aggrieved and disenchanted groups going outside normal political forms of expression and indiscriminate violence aimed at blackmailing the state. This argument tends to ignore the dynamics of politics and social life in contexts like Africa where the people employed as law enforcement officers are also products of the excluded and marginalized regions and in many cases are part of these extremist groups who feel the only way to get the state to listen is through violence or what Ford (2013:14), calls 'blackmailing the state'. As a result of the complex nature of terrorism, scholars are of the opinion that since it is almost impossible to know how many members a group has and their sources of supply in terms of arms and logistics, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies will vary according to the goals and ideologies of the terrorist groups themselves (Miller, 2007). Jaeger and Paserman (2006), in their study affirmed this position but added that policy prescription for addressing terrorist threats from groups differ mainly as a result of the political context, the threat environment and the government conducting the operations. While urging states to be flexible in tackling such threats he stated thus:

Counterterrorism operations are not fixed or static but are subject to change and should either remain consistent or should adapt according to nature of the terrorism threat.

In the case of Nigeria, it is obvious that the Nigerian government adopted both the war model and the criminal justice model in dealing with terrorists threats in the North-east and the Niger Delta region respectively. Through its Operation Lafia Dole in the North-east, Operation Pullo
Shield, Operation Delta Safe and the recently launched Operation Crocodile Smile in the Niger Delta region, the Nigeria armed forces have been able to dislodge, demobilize and degrade terrorist elements in different part of Nigeria. In the same vein, the proclamation of amnesty to aggrieved Niger Delta youths in June 2009 and the signing into law of several legislations such as the Freedom of Information law (2010), The Terrorism and Money Laundering Act (2011), including the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission clearly indicate that states can apply both models in analyzing terrorism and terrorist threats since terrorist groups are, to a large extent, rational organizations with realistic political goals hence, engaging with them could be useful for dealing with the threat.

Theoretical Framework
The need for an analytical framework in an investigation was re-enforced by Lieber, (1973) who argued that behind every concept or analysis, there is a theory or view point which makes it possible for the presentation and interpretation of facts. Clearly therefore, for there to be reliability in an investigation, there is serious need to come out with models or the formulation of theories: for empirical theory “seeks to create knowledge that is impersonal, retraceable and cumulative” (Lieber, 1973). This section of the study will rely on the rational choice theory of terrorism in order to explain why militia groups and aggrieved persons engage in terrorist activities in the society. The rational choice theory of terrorism according to Crenshaw (1992), assumes that terrorist acts usually emanate from rational, calculated, conscious decisions. These decisions according to Crenshaw represent an optimal strategy to fulfil the socio-political goals of the perpetrators. In order words, according to this theory, terrorism might not represent pathological or illogical behaviour but could represent the best means to fulfil personal needs in some circumstances. With reference to the psychopathology of terrorists, some scholars have argued that most terrorist are people with medical challenges who act under the influence of drugs or alcohol in order to satisfy themselves and the group they represent.

Thus, to others the rational choice theory of terrorism represents a reaction against the assumption that terrorism represents a psychopathology (meaning that terrorists are often assumed to be “insane”) or psychopaths. A research conducted by Cooper, 1948, Pearce, 1977: and Victoroff, 2005, to assess this proposition though imperfect: the evidence tends to indicate that terrorists seldom fulfil the criteria of psychological disorders. Further studies to ascertain whether terrorists exhibit Axis disorders such as major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, or schizophrenia was also conducted. Axis disorders represent all psychopathological disorders apart from personality disorders which are assumed to be more enduring and entrenched. Rasch (1979), for instance interviewed 11 terrorist suspects, some of whom were members of the Red Army Faction, also called the Baader Meinhof group and concluded at the end of investigation that non exhibited any psychological disorders hence, indicating that not all terrorists behave and act irrationally. Further (40) suspects by Post (2004) revealed that most terrorists are mentally and emotionally stable and can act rationally in order to achieve certain goals and objectives. In the same vein, Sprinzak and Denny (2003), also interviewed 14 radical Islamic terrorists operating in the Middle East but uncovered no evidence of Axis 1 disorders. Similar conclusions have also been reached by scholars such as
Crenshaw, 1981: Horgan, 2003: and Silke 1999. In spite of all the arguments, contemporary events clearly revealed that many terrorists are perceived as individuals who risk their lives to enhance the welfare of their community hence, acts of terrorism becomes a pro-socially rather than anti-social act. This explanation is especially applicable to nationalist separatist terrorists (Post, 2004). Advocates of the rational choice theory of terrorism therefore maintained that even suicide bombers often seem to exhibit altruistic motives, striving to serve Allah and their community. The above analysis clearly indicate that terrorist groups can adopts different strategies to achieve their goals and mission hence, what is important and fundamental is that the terrorist group see and perceive their actions as rational, not minding the havoc and impact of their actions. For instance, the terrorist attack in France and the Alshabaab/Al-Qaeda attack in Kenya's Garissa University which left over 150 students' dead shows that the perpetrators acted rationally and claimed responsibility for their actions and also warned that Kenya's involvement in the peace keeping operation in Somalia and French role in Mali was responsible for the attacks.

This again imply that terrorists can plan, organize, strategize and strike their targets and at the same time claim responsibility and also state their reasons thus, indicating that they are often rational in their operations. Within the context of this study and placing the Nigeria's Niger Delta crisis in perspective, one can infer that militia uprising in the Niger Delta region brought recognition and attention to the region which in turn led to the establishment of (NDDC) in 1999, creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs etc. hence, indicating that terrorist operations and actions could be violent and unconventional but are capable of resolving protracted conflicts among parties. As it is the case in Nigeria and South Africa where the activities of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Movement for the Emancipation for the Niger Delta (MEND) have helped to promote dialogue, cease fire and peace among the parties. From this perspective, proponents of the rational choice theory of terrorism maintain that terrorism might seem abominable but at the same time, their actions might equally represent the most potent and practical means of subordinate groups to influence powerful institutions and governments (Sandler and Enders, 2004 and Victoroff, 2005).

In spite of the validity and utility of the rational choice theory of terrorism to the study, it is equally pertinent to state categorically that every theory has it constraints and limitations hence, some scholars have argued that there is no rationality in the rational choice theory since some terrorist groups and organizations are driven by religious beliefs and ideas which often defy civilize democratic principles and the rule of law. According to Crenshaw (2000), “the goals of terrorists are sometimes implausible and therefore their acts will not fulfil their goals and thus, cannot be regarded as a rational attempt to pursue any such objective.” Victoroff (2005), made this point clear when he stated thus:

Profound feelings of revenge, ambition and trust in leaders can, thus, skew behaviour from the forces of rational processes.

Practical events at the regional and global level have also revealed that militia and terrorist group leaders have through negotiation, amnesty and DDR programmes been co-opted into peace building processes that have produced cease fire agreements and peace among contending forces.
Methodology and Scope
The concept of methodology according to Kaplan, cited in Obasi (1999), is to help in understanding in the broadest possible fashion both the products and the process of scientific enquiry. Nachmias and Nachmias (1985), also define methodology as a system of unambiguous rules and procedures upon which the basis of an enquiry or investigation is formed and claimed knowledge evaluated. Thus, this section of the study provides a description of the sources of data used and the applicable methodology. The study relied on published scholarly works such as textbooks, published articles, journals, policy documents from Nigeria’s amnesty office, the international news media, United Nation’s reports and materials retrieved from the internet etc (secondary sources).

The study also relied on the rational choice theory of terrorism as its theoretical framework while the data collected were analyzed through qualitative (descriptive) method and content analysis. Emphasis was however placed on the impact of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies on the internal security of African states with specific reference to Nigeria’s amnesty programme in the nine (9) Niger Delta states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers respectively.

Data Presentation and Analysis Showing the impact of Nonviolent Counterterrorism Strategies on the Internal Security of African States
This aspect of the study relied on the views expressed by scholars and experts in the field of peace and conflict studies and international relations contained in published scholarly works and reports. Tables and graphs were also presented and analyzed via content analysis where necessary. According to United Nations (2005) report, about 25 African countries were engaged in armed conflict or were experiencing political crisis. The report also noted that the following African countries have experienced UN/AU-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes: Angola, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra-Leon and Zimbabwe. Available records and statistics also revealed that seven (7) African countries in the Great Lake region benefited from the multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) with a target of 400,000 combatants under the sponsorship of the World Bank and thirteen (13) other donors which included twelve (12) European countries and the European Union (EU). It is on record that the MDRP project started in 2002 and closed in June 2009 with about 300,000 ex-combatants demobilized and 232,000 ex-combatants reintegrated hence, indicating that a total of five hundred and thirty two thousand (532,000) ex-combatants from seven (7) African countries were demobilized and reintegrated through nonviolent DDR schemes sponsored and coordinated by external partners. This no doubt implies that the success of any nonviolent counterterrorism strategy depends on the cooperative behaviour of states and in the willingness to abide by international rules, laws and conventions. The tables below shows European Union’s assistance to poor African countries.
Table 1: EU Assistance to the Sahel Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region</th>
<th>Ongoing (in million £)</th>
<th>Programmed (in million £)</th>
<th>Proposed additional resources (in million £)</th>
<th>Total (in million £)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>173.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>21.25</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>52.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African region</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>263.15</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>168.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>606.25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 9th and 10th EDF, budget lines and thematic programmes published 10th May, 2010

Table 2: EU Assistance to the Maghreb Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country region</th>
<th>Ongoing (in million £)</th>
<th>Planned (in million £)</th>
<th>New resources</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>193.5</strong></td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td><strong>193.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 9th and 10th EDF, budget lines and thematic programmes published 10th May, 2010

Apart from assisting poor African countries as reflected in the above tables, the European Union and other external development partners have also invested huge financial resources in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants and victims of war and insurgency in different parts of Africa. The data in the table below clearly affirm this position.
Table 3: Comparative analysis of Angola and Nigeria disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DDR Features</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period under review</td>
<td>01/09/2003</td>
<td>01/03/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of actors</td>
<td>UNITA Soldiers/ex-combatants</td>
<td>Environmental activists/ex-agitators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>91,127 ex-combatants registered</td>
<td>30,000 agitators registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>35 Quartering areas setup for the project</td>
<td>Only in 1 Quartering area in Obubura but disarmament don in different locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Offer</td>
<td>General amnesty to all UNITA Soldiers in 2002 after the death of their leader</td>
<td>Amnesty to all who signed up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Reception for both UNITA Soldiers and dependants</td>
<td>Reception to only ex-agitators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependants</td>
<td>288,756 Family members registered</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitance to National Force</td>
<td>5,000 Integrated into National Army</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration Training Types</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional apprenticeship and on the job training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community works access to tool kits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Micro business training, advisory services and micro credit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Academic trainings for degree qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation Agency</td>
<td>Ministry of Ex-combatants and motherland veterans and IRSEM managing the DDR project</td>
<td>OSAPND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration and Speed</td>
<td>Between 2003 and 2005 over 20,000 ex-combatants benefiting from Reintegration</td>
<td>11,700 have received reintegration packages between 2010 and 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Donor and National Government Funding; received USD522, 950,865 from MDRP and UNPP as of July 2008</td>
<td>Only Nigeria Government Funding USD514,233.064 – 89.72 spent till date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Ex-combatants and Motherland Veterans</td>
<td>Ministry of Niger Delta (but not managing the DDR project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stipends</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>USD $400 monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Trend</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Introduction of training opportunities for 1,000 people from the conflict impacted communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted From Abazie, 2014
Further analysis showing the impact of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies on peace and internal security in Africa is expressly stated in the above table. Angola’s DDR programme was national in scope involving UNITA soldiers and over 90,000 ex-combatants while the DDR programme in Nigeria was limited to the Niger Delta region with a total of 30,000 ex-combatants. In the area of funding, the DDR programme in Angola was funded by the Angolan government with the active support of external donor agencies such as the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which released a total of $22,950,865 USD as at July 2008. In the case of Nigeria, only the Nigeria government through the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta (OSAPND) funded the DDR programme and released the sum of $14,233,064,89.72 USD (Abazie, 2014). In the same vein, a special ministry known as the ministry of ex-combatants and mother land veterans led the whole process in Angola while in Nigeria, the DDR project was domiciled in the presidency. However, a crucial aspect of the DDR programme in Angola revealed that trainees were not exposed to allowances or financial inducements during the training and reintegration period but in the case of Nigeria, militants were given the sum of N65,000 (400 USD) monthly before and during the training and reintegration exercise. After studying the DDR programme in Nigeria and Angola Abazie (2014), concluded that the commitment of local actor’s involvement in the DDR process will minimize the issue of duplication and surrogates hence, the interveners will be able to identify such issues quickly than external actors. In the words of MacGinty (2010:402) “Local actors are capable of influencing the extent to which peace might be hybridized since they can resist, ignore, subvert or adopt liberal peace intervention programmes”.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that nonviolent counterterrorism strategies through DDR help to carryout post-conflict analysis and reintegration of ex-combatants and agitators back to civilian life and in the process prevent a spread and re-occurrence of such conflicts. Thus, the role of the United Nations Development Programme, and regional organizations in the promotion and enthronement of peace and internal security through nonviolent approaches can therefore not be overemphasized. The Multi-country Demobilization and Re-integration Programme (MDRP) carried out by the World Bank and European Union countries involving seven (7) African countries no doubt led to the demobilization and reintegration of over eight hundred thousand (800,000) ex-combatants who turned-in their arms and returned to normal civilian life hence, promoting peace, stability, internal security and nonviolence across the world.

Conclusion
The above analysis indicate that the rising rate of conflict and insurgency is a major threat confronting all states while terrorism have also been described as a threat to peace and security at the national, regional and global levels hence, studies into counterterrorism measures will no doubt help to correct existing defects and gaps in the conflict resolution process leading to post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and other victims of war across the world. The study also revealed that the use of military force as a conflict resolution mechanism by states yielded minimum results while in the case of Nigeria, the deployment of the armed forces throughout the Niger Delta region helped to escalate the
conflict which led to the proliferation of militia groups and camps across the oil rich region. However, change of policy by the Nigerian government via the proclamation of amnesty to Niger Delta agitators in June 2009 by the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua-led administration helped to reduce tension and hostilities in the Niger Delta region. In the same vein, the application of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in Angola and other African countries have also helped to reintegrate and resettle several ex-combatants across the world. In all, records available further revealed that the implementation of post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in Africa is full of challenges that need to be addressed by African states.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations will no doubt help to improve the conflict resolution and management process in Nigeria and Africa in general.

1. To effectively combat insurgency and terrorism: Countries should adhere strictly to international protocols and principles such as the 1999 Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy which calls for a holistic inclusive approach to counterterrorism.

2. Oil related legislations and policies that encourage exclusion and alienation of minority ethnic groups in Nigeria should be repealed, abolished and discarded to ensure justice, equity and fairness to all.

3. The renunciation of violence oath taking by all ex-combatants during the disarmament and demobilization process should be enforced by the government in order to track those who have returned to armed struggle in the creeks.

4. The amnesty policy should be institutionalized through the establishment of an amnesty, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission or ministry to oversee post-conflict resettlement issues in Nigeria. The current practice whereby the amnesty policy is coordinated by the office of the special adviser to the president on Niger Delta Affairs is full of inconsistencies and contradictions.

5. Rather than place emphasis on the welfare of ex-militants, the ongoing amnesty programme should be reviewed to accommodate the core issues that triggered-off the crisis in the Niger Delta hence, issues such as environmental degradation, infrastructural development and equal participation in the oil and gas sector should be placed at the front burner.

6. There is also need for Nigeria and African countries to carry out a comprehensive and integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme to ensure that ex-combatants do not constitute security threat to the society.

7. Nonviolent counterterrorism strategies and methods should be introduced as part of the education curriculum in Africa in order to inculcate the culture of peace in the heart and minds of African youths and children at all levels. Thus, the understanding of nonviolence is a panacea for peace at an early stage will help to produce what is now called de-radicalization and counter-radicalization of citizens who had earlier beenbriefed and misinformed (radicalized) by extremist or terrorist elements.
References


