The Elite and Bureaucracy in the Nigerian Political Development

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Abstract

The paper which bothers on the elite and bureaucracy in the Nigerian political development adopted the qualitative method of data collection basically, content analysis. The elites have promoted political crises through the process of over politicization of social life and over centralization of the federal arrangement. The presence or absence of stable political institutions is one of the major differences between political systems that can be explained on the basis of differences between elites. It will be unusual for political power not to be effectively institutionalized in the more developed countries such as Britain, the United States, The Netherlands etc. than in the less developed countries like Nigeria. Indeed, stable political institutions are marked by the absence of irregular seizures of government executive power or obvious military influence in policy-making through threats of military intervention. What is more fundamental is that political power ascendancy or political authority usually happening in accordance with principles and rules that, in spite of being largely informal, are well known. The paper concluded that in Nigeria, the military has dominated the elite class like most other less developed states. Although the elite have made indelible mark in the political development of Nigeria through the instrumentality of the bureaucracy, the military seems to have had the most profound influence in the realization of the political developments achieved in Nigeria.

Keywords: The elites, The military, Political development, Political authority, Political power ascendancy

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Background to the Study
The term Elite according to Encarta (2009) derives from Latin “Eligere” which means to elect”. Elites are relatively small dominant group within a large society. The concept of elite is used to describe certain fundamental features of social life. This concept considers that within the governing class there is always the inevitability of a small group emerging in the society no matter what ideology society adopts. This was propounded by an Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) who studied the non-rational bases of human conduct. What is rather fundamental about elitism is its theory which believes that there is the existence of a group that is universal, permanent and even desirable phenomenon in society, political system or ideology and in effect, a part refutation of any other theory suggesting therefore the possibility or utility of an absolute equality, true democracy, a real dictatorship of the proletariat or a communist society. It should be pointed out that orthodox Marxism rejects this assertion and even repudiates the existence of the elite in society because for them, society is made up of classes namely, the oppressed and their oppressors. To the contrary, elite theory vehemently rejects the Marxist position and emphasizes the prevalence of the elite rather than the exploiting class in society.

Following from the above, Higley (2009) notes that the reality is that there are both classes and elites such as trade union leaders, opinion leaders, organizers, including rabble-rousers all within the ranks of the proletariat and peasantry. Substantial part of the intelligentsia, property owners, government leaders as well as political actors fall within the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, some form of inequalities talent and circumstances exist be it among the bourgeoisie, proletarian, feudal or within any other class and this is where elite theory does better in identifying the outstanding people within each group irrespective of how they achieved their means such as economic, social, heredity etc.

Pareto, according to Igwe (2005), holds that “division within the governing class and conflict among elites lead to social change, (while) social stability on the other hand presumes the circulation of elites, that is, free access to the governing class by men of talent and determination and the elimination of weaker members of the elite.” He, however, did not defend aristocracy which for him tend to interfere with the circulation of the elite. The Pareto point of view has been adopted and adapted to the reality of the political situation in the societies of the Less Developed Countries such that Ake (1991) hold that ‘the social class which by virtue of its control of the means of production is (also) able to command preponderance of social, political and economic goods and power’. This Ake (1991) explanation implies that the power elite use the position the occupy in government to enrich themselves and their associates only to produce retrogressive results which include but not limited to such things as poverty, inequality, unemployment, plan failure etc. all of which will certainly lead to underdevelopment.

Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Italian political thinker and politician who is noted for his theory of the ‘ruling class’(classepolitica) gave articulation to what he believed to be an objective analysis of society in his 1896 most influential book Elementi di Scienza Political which was revised 1923. According to Igwe (2005), Moscacon tended that the balance of various social forces allows a ruling class to form and impose its own 'political formula' a powerful myth that justifies its rule to its subjects; but the ruling class must then develop mechanisms for satisfying the demands of new social forces or give way to them.
For Mosca, it follows that in all societies two classes of people appear, a class that rules and a class that is ruled. This means that societies need elites that can uphold high standards against the selfish instincts of the masses. It can be deduced therefore that an organized elite lord it over the unorganized majority (Masses) because in every political setting, democratic concept is seemingly a foolish delusion, as political power is always exercised by a privilege minority. Howbeit, critics of Mosca's theory of ruling class are of the view that it was misused by some elements to justify fascism.

**Diagnosis of the Elite Theory**

Origins of Elite theory according to Higley (2009), lie most clearly in the writings of Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), and Robert Michels (1876-1936). Higley (2009) notes that Mosca emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities out-organize and outwit large majorities, adding that 'political classes'-Mosca's term for political elites-usually have 'a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority' over those they govern. Pareto on the other hand postulated that in a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals; but in actual societies elites are those most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections, (Higley, 2009). Similarly, Pareto sketched alternating types of governing elites, which he likened, following Machiavelli, to lions and foxes. Michels as a matter of fact, rooted elites (“oligarchies”) in the need of large organizations for leaders and experts in order to operate efficiently; as these individuals gain control of funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational functioning power becomes concentrated in their hands. (Higley, 2009).

Emphasizing the inescapability and also the relative autonomy of elites, all three men characterized aspirations to fully democratic and egalitarian societies as futile. Many democrats and social radicals have rejected this “futility thesis” (Ekpe, 2017). They have sought to demonstrate that particular elites are not those with superior endowments or organizational capacities, but merely persons who are socially advantaged in power competitions. Adherents of this view have argued that the existence of elites can be terminated either by removing the social advantages that some people enjoy or by abolishing the power concentrations that spur competitions among them- remedies that often go hand-in-hand. There are no historical instances, however, where these remedies have been successfully applied in a large population for any significant length of time.

To further and better situate the subject under discussion, it becomes necessary to again define the elite as persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially. Put differently, elites are persons with the organized capacity to make real political trouble without being promptly repressed. They consist not only of prestigious and 'established' leaders-top politicians, important businessmen, high-level civil servants, senior military officers-but also, in varying degrees in different societies, relatively transitory and less individually known leaders of mass organizations such as trade unions, important voluntary associations, and politically consequential mass movements. It is important to stress that this is a limited and specifically political definition of elites. It is restricted to persons who are at the top of the pyramid or pyramids of political, economic, and social power (Aduloju, 2017). It does not consider all those in a society who enjoy high occupational, educational, or cultural statuses to be elites in a political sense.
Meaningfully democratic institutions and practices as opined by Higley (2009), depend upon the type of elite that a society has, no type of elite is compatible with the full democratic ideal that is reasonably compatible with stable democratic politics and practices. The most common political situation is that of ‘disunited elites’ which has basic features of institutional instability. While institutions operated by some part of a disunited elite may at times have a formally democratic facade, the institutions are hardly worth much promotion or defence because they are unlikely to survive a serious political crisis.

Commonly, any substantial increase in normal political tensions leads, with or without a military coup, to a more authoritarian and repressive government. Although such a government may eventually mellow or even be replaced by a more democratic one that has the tacit consent of the elite veto group associated with the military, this improvement is likely to be merely an interval in a succession of more or less repressive governments. There are historical evidences which are overwhelming and suggest that disunited elites and the unstable institutions they create persist through most vicissitudes and that each government is in practice one permitted by those who happen to control military and police forces. The circumstances in which disunited elites become ideologically or consensually united are unlikely to appeal to people with democratic sentiments yet an ideologically united elite does not allow competitive politics, and where it exists meaningful actions motivated by democratic sentiments are nearly impossible. (Higley, 2009)

The Elite and Political Stability in Nigeria
The presence or absence of stable political institutions is one of the major differences between political systems that can be explained on the basis of differences between elites. In Nigeria the business elites and political elites appear to be the most power with the later has so much impact in the political development. The first set of Nigerian elites Herbert Macaulay, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Christopher Okigbo, Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Mallam Aminu Kano, Fumilayo Ransom-Kuti to mention but few were the people who played significant role in fighting the colonialists to a standstill, and through their effort in 1960 political independent was achieved. Through the effort of the nationalists who we could term them first Nigerian Elite, indeed, Nigeria was able to maintain true federalism between1960 and 1967. Nwokocha (2007) confirmed this when he stated that if the principles of federation where adhered to by the four regional governments from 1960-1967 before the civil war broke out it would not have been contained in the states there had it not been for true federalism.

After the first set of elite, other elites emerged comprising the past and present governors, president, ministers and commissioners. These political elites are those who have decision making power in the state resulting from their statutory or institutional position, or who have influence in policy decision. With this bogus power rested in and on them, they influence electoral process to a very high degree. It does not matter whom the masses choice but whom they have chosen, for that exalted position. That is why Nwokocha (2007) opined that in Nigeria the elites have promoted political crises through the process of over politicization of social life and over centralization of the federal arrangement.

Bureaucracy
Many reasons have been adduced why top bureaucrats are involved in policymaking. One such reason according to Nwokocha (2007), is that ‘the politicians of third world countries are creatures of their environment, (most times) poor education, non-availability of the necessary
and relevant literature...most of them are ignorant or ill-informed, the bureaucrats therefore, with their superior education, find it convenient to impose their views, even if by way of advice to the politicians who are relieved of the burden of thinking and critical examination of the issues concerned.' As he argued, in a situation such as this, the civil servants especially the permanent secretaries find themselves in a most formidable position.

For Adedeji (1981) the bureaucrat is involved in politics, because he deals with the personal deficiencies inflicting the politician. Further, Adedeji (1981) opined that such personal deficiencies include, the attitude of the politician who conceived his role as approving or disapproving whatever proposals put before him by his secretary. In addition, he observed that most of the Ministers, Commissioners and political heads have low education, having been thrown into their offices because of political circumstances. Thus, most of them read through the permanent secretary's submission without comprehension and in order to hide their ignorance will minute back to the Permanent Secretary, "I agree with you, please proceed." In like manner, Adedeji (1981) contends that the budget, which is a work programme for the government over a given period, is an exercise conducted almost entirely by civil servants. Thus, the views and influence of the civil servants over the entire government becomes dominant. There is no gain saying the fact that whereas bureaucrats are not politicians, their skill, expertise, knowledge of rules and regulations of government procure can only be ignored by the political class at their own peril.

Obi (2008) has noted that the bureaucracy is that instrument with which policies are crafted, implemented for development purposes. This is because every known public or government endeavour is policy-driven; therefore, the bureaucracy is inevitable. It is this entity or institution that is also known as the public service. This was developed for the most part by sociologists notably Max Weber (1864-1920) a German whose work greatly influenced considerable number of scholars. Kalu (2007) opines that the reason why government business is driven by bureaucracy is “essentially because the role of government in economic development is central to its activities, and by bureaucracy, the various departments and agencies design, implement and monitor policies of government.”

The public service refers to all organizations that exist as part of government machinery for implementing policy decisions and delivering services that are of value to citizens. It is according to the Public Service reforms (2006) a mandatory institution of the State under the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as outlined in Chapter VI of the constitution under the title: the Executive, Part I (D) and Part II (C), which provides for a public service at the Federal and State levels of the government.

**Composition of the Nigerian Bureaucracy**

The Public Service in Nigeria according to Kalu (2007) and Nwankwo (2008) comprises the following:

(i) The civil service, often referred to as the core service, consisting of line ministerial agencies

(ii) The public bureaucracy, or the enlarged public service, made up of the following:

   a. Services of the state and national assemblies
   b. The judiciary
   c. The armed forces
   d. The police and other security agencies
e. Paramilitary services (immigration, customs, prisons, etc)
f. Parastatals and agencies—including social services, commercially-oriented agencies, regulatory agencies, educational institutions, research institutes, etc.

The public service in Nigeria according to the Public Service Reforms (2006) is a “colonial heritage of public administration, during colonial rule, the upper echelon of the Civil Service was dominated by Europeans on whom were concentrated executive, judicial and legislative powers’. It further stated that succeeding constitutional reviews however ‘increased the stake of Nigerians at the helms of the public service while the 1960 independence catalyzed the evolution of the Nigerian Public Service as a national institution for spearheading the rapid transformation of the nation and ensuring continuity of administration.”

The Nigerian Public Service according to Obi (2008) in its early origins, was on one hand, an obedient instrument of the governing authorities, and on the other hand, an impartial interpreter and implementer of the policies and programmes of government. Gradually the public service earned public confidence and was largely perceived as the protector of public interest.

In the late 1980s according to Lawanson and Adeoye (2013), the public service showed signs of progressive decay arising first, from the structural unprecedented growth lapses of the oil boom driven era of the 1970s when expansion of the service took place without adequate capacity to match the resultant increased responsibilities; and second, from a combination of Human Resources Management defects that began to creep into the system, namely:

i. Over-centralization, increased conflicts between cadres,
ii. Little emphasis on results and concrete performance,
iii. Counterproductive separation of authority from responsibility at the topmost hierarchy, and
iv. Inappropriate staff development practices.

In the process, its capacity to adequately respond to new development challenges which require alternative innovative strategies of managing the public service and redefining the role of the state in a development paradigm became weakened. With increased and elongated tenure of military rule, the Public Service also began to imbibe the predominant governance ideology, along with corruption. However, whether the bureaucracy is distorted, corrupt or there is organizational fragmentation leading to the institution being distasteful does not change the fact that the organization is needed in more ways than one to drive development efforts particularly in the less developed countries through the instrumentality of public policy.

The Military as Elite
The attempt here is to capture and analyze the place and implication of the military as an integral part of the elite in the development of Nigerian political system. This effort will focus mainly on the period between 1960 and 1999 and it is also basically because the military and their activities had profound impact on the political landscape of Nigeria and it was also a period that the first political experiment after independence was disrupted by the military. Over the years it has been from one military rule to another, from 1966-1979, and 1983-1999. This happened with Nigeria adequately prepared to develop a democratic political culture that will stand the test of time; unfortunately, the protracted military rule has inflated the polity with several political changes which has resulted into poor political development, which does not ensure stability in the system.
How Military Rule Started
Nwanegbo, Tsuwa, and Jega (2013) agree with Ikejiani-Clark (2010) that military rule has always been seen as an aberration because, the military has statutory role and responsibility it performs in the society and that clearly excludes governance. Howbeit, this segment focuses on Nigeria and how the military come to power and how it has impacted on political development. The intervention of the military in politics remained a big surprise among political actors in Nigeria. This could be because they are well placed to intervene due to their hierarchical structure and its distinctive pattern of training and recruitment. Okadigbo (1987) in Kalu (2007) posits that the military is disposed to take over government because it has monopoly over the nation's weaponry.

Accordingly, Wilson (2012) is of the view that instability and political crises have tended to destroy Nigeria's democratic future. He maintained that in the midst of instability and uncertainty there can be no strong political order in Nigeria. The way and manner coups and counter-coups happened could never have ushered in stability and political order. This assertion was in direct response to the incessant and prolonged military stay and intervention in the polity of Nigeria.

Articulated reason for Military intervention in Nigeria's Political System
Wilson (2012) and Fabiyi, Thotteh and Borisade (2012) posits that the following are some of the reasons for the intervention into the polity.

1. To restore sanity and development of the economy
2. Inability or failure of previous government to completely and effectively oversee and control the affairs of the nation.
3. Regular allegations of corruption, nepotism and tribalism among politicians and the political class which results in production decline, abandonment of infrastructural development etc.
4. Underdevelopment

Historical Account of Military Incursion into Politics
On January 1, 1966 some dissident junior and middle-grade officers provoked a military coup that brought an end to the civil government of Nigeria. That singular action according to Ikejiani-Clark (2010) consumed the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and his Finance Minister, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, in Lagos. Also assassinated were the Western Region Premier, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, and the Northern Region Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello. Emerging January 16, 1966 as Chief of State of a provisional military government was Army Commander, Major General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, thus signaling that the military in Nigeria has indeed lost its political virginity.

On May 24, 1966 Aguiyi-Ironsi, according to Kalu (2014) announced reforms that would abolish the federation, reduce the four regions to provinces, ban political parties, and unify the civil service. No sooner had these reforms been announced that resentment from other ethnic groups followed, so much that during the months of May, June, and July, some 600 Igbos were beaten and murdered in the northern cities of Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Sokoto, Zaria, and Bauchi. The mayhem that followed saw at least 250'000 Igbos choke the roads and rail tracks fleeing for their Eastern Region homeland. This situation was to get worse when on July 29, 1966 General Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed and his military government overthrown.
Kalu (2014) further stated that the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon *(he is from the Northern region of the Plateau extraction, a Christian; his father, a Methodist Minister)* emerged as national leader. He abolished the centralized government established in May by Aguiyi-Ironsi, and reintroduced the federal system. He decreed on May 28 the division of the federation, which had consisted of 4 regions and a federal territory, into 12 states, 3 of them from the Eastern Region, each to be autonomous and responsible for law and order. Two days later the Eastern Region, led by its Oxford-educated Military Governor, Major General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, seceded from the Federation of Nigeria, declaring itself the Republic of Biafra *(named after the Bight of Biafra, an inlet on the Gulf of Guinea)*.

The embittered Igbos according to Stock (2009) wanted security and more autonomy for the Eastern Region than Federal Governor Gowon was willing to grant. Ojukwu, however, gave Gowon until March 31, 1967, to put into effect agreements reached at a conference held in Aburi, Ghana in January for a loose confederation of states for Nigeria. The secession followed long-simmering hostility among Nigeria's several tribes, most of which are separated by religion, culture, and language. Stock (2009) posits that most Igbos are Christians, well-educated by African standards, politically forward-looking, skillful, highly enterprising and energetic; whereas some of the other tribes are conservative and generations behind the Igbos educationally. The most populous country in Africa continued to hurtle towards disaster in the three years of a devastating civil war. Who fired the first shoot or salvo remains a question only the combatants can answer.

Adebisi (2002) notes that what started as organized resistance for which the central government said it was taking police action eventually led to Nigeria's 30-months, bitterly fought civil war that ended on January 12, 1970 with a declaration of Biafra's surrender over Radio Biafra by Major General Philip Effiong. He succeeded the secessionist leader General Odumegwu Ojukwu, who fled, on January 11, to Ivory Coast to seek asylum. Unconditional surrender was accepted on January 15 by the Federal government leader Major General Yakubu Gowon, who declared general amnesty “for all those misled into attempting to disintegrate the country”. After a declaration of “no victor; no vanquished”, he added, “we have been reunited with our brothers.”

**Some Achievements of the Military**

Ojo and Oyedele (2009) opine that despite the fact that the military was responsible for the civil war that engulfed Nigeria, it nevertheless ended what it started successfully. Accordingly, the military strived to put the country on a pedestal of steady progress. Nigeria's economic progress became dominated by a remarkable oil boom, as oil revenues rose from £4.4 million in 1960 to £489 million in 1971, when they accounted for 73% of export earnings. Income from oil was expected to contribute £500 million to Nigeria's total estimated federal revenues of £650 million in 1972-1973.

Abdul (2002) and Kalu (2014) agree that the economy registered a highly satisfactory growth rate of 9.6% during 1971-1972, double the rate projected in the four-year plan of that period. A growth rate of 12% was projected for 1972-1973. Damage resulting from the civil war was estimated during the year at £300 million. Reconstruction efforts were concentrated in the hardest-hit area, East-Central State (the actual theater of war), which was still troubled by massive unemployment. The mounting oil revenues enabled the federal government to increase its contribution to the state budget by 40%, allowing the state almost to balance its budget for the first time since its creation in 1966.
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the economy according to Nwankwo (2009) was the effort to increase the government's share in all phases of the oil industry and to “Nigerianize” the industrial sector in general. This came at the heels of the indigenization policy of government. Furthermore, a new policy according to Badmus (2010) requiring 51% participation by the Nigerian Oil Corporation in all new exploration ventures was first implemented in November 1971, when 51% of three Japanese offshore oil exploration companies were taken over. In April 1972 the government announced that the oil corporation was also to participate in the production, refining, and marketing of oil and that no additional foreign concessions would be granted.

Nwokocha (2007) and Stock (2009) agree that the “Nigerianization” was not restricted to the oil sector only. A decree was issued on March 1 requiring 40% Nigerian participation in most industries and the total exclusion of foreigners from retail trade, and from certain light industries, and services such as haulage, departmental stores, retail trading, and from industries with a fixed capital below N400'000 unless annual turnover exceeded N3 million. Foreigners in the remaining sectors were required to invite 40% Nigerian participation, including Shell-BP which the government had acquired as of April, 1972 retaining 35% of its equity shareholding, and planning to take 51% control by 1982. The decree was to become operational by 1974 and to be carried out or implemented by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board. This was in addition to a government take-over of 40% of the equity of all commercial banks operating in Nigeria.

In tandem with the “Nigerianization” policy of the economy, Nwokocha (2007) and Stock (2009) opined that national economy enjoyed real boom but growth of the agricultural sector slowed down considerably. Food production did not keep pace with the rapid growth of population and prices of foodstuffs rose to all time high. Foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports dropped and in order to increase efficiency and raise farmers’ incomes, the federal government took over from local marketing boards the responsibility for fixing prices for farmers’ produce bought by the state marketing boards, including cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, oil palm products, and minor oilseeds. The government also established the Agricultural Credit Bank with an initial working capital of N12 million; the bank was set up with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. It was designed to make funds available to farmers to improve production techniques, storage, and marketing.

In like manner, Kalu (2014) points out that the need to expand the national reservoir of skilled personnel was one factor in the decision to increase the number of students in higher education to 7'000 by the end of 1974. The military government was of the view that the spread of education would assist national unity with the attendant advocacy by such persons as Obafemi Awolowo for immediate free compulsory school starting in 1975 and a waiver of repayment on student loans. Such steps were clearly essential if full economic independence along the lines projected by the federal government was to be achieved.

In the meantime, the census in November 1973 was released in May of 1974, which according to Aleyomi (2012) showed annual growth rate of 4% over the 10-year period, thus pushing the population figures from 55.8 million of the last figures to 79.7 million, with the northern part of the country well ahead in population. In 1974, the decimal monetary system was introduced as the Naira and Kobo replaced the Nigerian pounds and Shillings. Similarly, Stock (2009)
revealed that the metric system of weights and measures replaced the imperial system while the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was introduced in June of 1973, despite opposition and demonstrations (peaceful and violent) by ‘great’ Nigerian students. Import duties on certain machinery and raw materials for construction, food production, and local industries were reduced or abolished to stimulate growth while import duties on luxury goods and large cars were increased.

The Third National Development Plan was reviewed and according to Kalu (2014) “Operation Feed the Nation” (OFN) was started in April 1973 in an effort to bring about self-sufficiency in food production and maximize the production of export crops. Government agencies provided cheap fertilizer, better seedlings, and free farm machinery. Improvements in food delivery, storage, and processing were implemented. A National Council was appointed to oversee the project, and regional councils and committees were established in all states. Despite less-than-encouraging agricultural production, the Nigerian national economy showed a 10% rise in real growth in 1976-1977, as compared with only 2.8% in 1975-1976. Farm production was up by 3%, and the rate of inflation slowed from 35% in 1975-1976 to about 20% in 1976-1977 (Kalu, 2014).

Stock (2009) further noted that with effect from April 1, 1973, the two agencies responsible for regulating Nigerian oil production, the National Oil Corporation and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, were dissolved and reconstituted into a single entity, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Also, NNPC announced that it had finalized an agreement for a $666 million oil refinery with a Japanese chemical engineering firm, Chiyoda Kako. The refinery to be built at Kaduna was to be completed in mid-1980 and indeed, it was completed.

The implementation of the country’s Third National Development Plan as observed by Kalu (2014) was handicapped by shortage of trained manpower, and as more than 50'000 skilled Nigerians were working in foreign countries, Nigerian embassies in the United States and Europe embarked upon a massive campaign to recruit them back to Nigeria. Similarly, in its continuous effort to indigenize the Nigerian economy as much as possible, the government promulgated the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees, which listed 40 enterprises reserved exclusively for Nigerians. To further improve on trained manpower, the government completed preliminary surveys for the sites of seven more universities, to be added to the existing seven.

In like manner, Nwanegbo, Tsuwa, and Jega (2013) pointed out that the military government revealed plans to construct four teaching hospitals, with a total of 9'000 beds, to be completed by early 1980. Government also began an experiment in free primary education whose immediate and major problem was a lack of adequately trained teachers. To this end, government announced a recruitment goal of 17'270 new teachers, from both within and outside of Nigeria and also introduced a situation whereby Nigerian students in Nigerian institutions of higher learning had their tuition and fees paid by the federal government; they were required to pay only their room and board.

Wilson (2012) opines that national self-reliance and rapid economic growth occupied a central place in Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation. Nigeria took steps in the direction of major economic and political reforms. The country’s debt was rescheduled and the Structural Adjustment Programme initiated. The creditors, along with the World Bank, also agreed to
provide fresh loans to support Nigerian trade and adjustment efforts. These provisional agreements were contingent upon approval of Nigeria's adjustment policies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which came formally in February, with the authorization of a special-drawing-right facility of $650 million. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was an effort to reorganize Nigeria's foreign debt, improve government finances, and change public spending priorities. The programme also sought to transform incentives and production patterns throughout the economy. To this end, the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRR) was given a generous budgetary allotment for the purpose of improving rural infrastructure and productivity.

Ojo and Oyedele (2009) posit that SAP was formally concluded in June 1985 although the economic liberalization entailed by the programme was not. The ambitious reforms brought some measure of relief from the burdens of Nigeria’s $25 billion foreign debt. However, domestic production did not rebound, the standard of living declined, and the military government's relations with foreign creditors were ambivalent. International financial institutions, for their part, offered mixed appraisals of Nigeria's economic performance, and the government's efforts at economic reform did not elicit a significant influx of new loans or investment and during the year the government and the commercial banks agreed on short-term rollovers of $1.2 billion in loan repayments owed by Nigeria, as well as the postponement of repayments of principal on over $2 billion in letters of credit. Economic growth and production provided a mixed picture.

Enuka (2013) noted that Nigeria's gross domestic product showed a modest 1.2% increase for 1987, representing a considerable improvement over the 3.3% decline or negative growth in 1986. As of February 1988, the government had announced a new agricultural policy, greater foreign investment in agriculture was to be allowed, and the government planned to curtail its direct involvement in agricultural production and marketing.

On another front, Enuka (2013) observed that regional tensions arose when Nigeria became embroiled in a protracted dispute with the tiny neighboring country of Equatorial Guinea over that country's ties with South Africa. In May, Nigeria demanded the expulsion of five South Africans working in Equatorial Guinea, presumably as 'agricultural advisers.' In June 1988, after their apparent expulsion, it was reported that the five had been seen in the country. Rumors of a possible Nigerian invasion of Equatorial Guinea gave way to a more muted diplomatic quarrel, which ultimately reached the councils of the United Nations. In July the Nigerians accepted Equatorial Guinea's assurance that the South Africans had indeed been expelled, and Nigeria settled into an uneasy harmony with its neighbor.

Similarly, Fabiyi, Thotteh, and Borisade (2012) pointed out that the economic reform and austerity brought considerable hardship as inflation increased, unemployment escalated, and essential commodities became increasingly expensive for many low-income consumers. The privations of economic adjustment provoked considerable social tensions, which erupted in widespread riots over a two-week period in May and June. Disturbances on university campuses in Lagos, Benin, Port Harcourt, and elsewhere spilled into the streets as students, market women, and unemployed workers violently demonstrated their frustration over the nation's economic plight. The so-called SAP riots left at least 22 dead according to officials, though press estimates suggested that as many as 50 might have died. In June, and in response to the unrest, the government announced a programme to ease some of SAP-inflicted austerity.
The economic relief package included an effort to create 62'000 new jobs, policies to reduce the cost of essential drugs and transportation, and measures to boost agricultural production.

In July 1988 according to Nwankwo (2009), Nigeria sent a large contingent to join troops from Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone in an ECOWAS peacekeeping operation known as Economic Community Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), and subsequently Nigeria had more than 2'000 troops in Liberia. Nigeria reconsidered its involvement in the crisis but remained as part of the force, which then turned its attention to creating a buffer between the two feuding rebel factions. The government also convened a large economic roundtable, known as Vision 2010, to plan a strategic vision for the country into the next century and by September; the high-profile government panel of Vision 2010 submitted its economic recommendations to the government. The panel advocated a sweeping liberalization of the economy, including massive deregulation and privatization of public utilities and the lucrative oil sector, some of these have formed the influences that the Military has exacted on the Political Development of Nigeria.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**
Conclusively, the findings of this study reveals that the political development of Nigeria cannot be complete without the elite which the military constitute part of; the military has affected Nigeria's political development such that a new democratic dispensation midwife by the military came into place since 1999 and has sustained to date with a more stable political terrain in which civil rule has been maintained by several political parties. There is no doubt that the elite controlling the bureaucracy and the military have made indelible mark in the political development of Nigeria. Nevertheless, one may be become confused as to whether the role of the military as part of the elite is corrective or redemptive; indeed, it cannot be any especially when the constitution is banned, democratic institutions suspended and they rule by fiat or decree, by that token, the military can only be good in their traditional roles.
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